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PEOPLE v. TRIGGS: A NEW CONCEPT OF
PERSONAL PRIVACY IN SEARCH
AND SEIZURE LAW
There's lots of places where fruits hang out, like public rest-
rooms. Well, some of these places install vents covered with heavy
mesh screen or something like that, where we can peek through
into the restroom area. Most of the places take the doors off the
shithouses for us too. Then we sit in the trap, as we call it, and
peek through into the restroom. Of course there's legal techni-
calities like probable cause and exploratory searches involved
here, but I'll tell you about that when we make the arrest report
-if we catch any.1
This note concerns the right to personal privacy and its relation
to search and seizure law. It is urged herein that the principle case,
People v. Triggs,2 represents a new conceptualization by the California
Supreme Court of the right to privacy. By condemning the clandestine
nature of the police observation of public restooms, the case extends
the expectation of privacy test announced in Katz v. United States3 to
cover this method visual surveillance. The focus of the note, therefore,
is on the new definition of privacy announced in Triggs and how that
innovation affects the law of search and seizure. Extensive references
will be made to the relation between the right to privacy and the plain
view doctrine of search and seizure law. The note will conclude with
an explanation of the possible ramifications People v. Triggs could have
in the field of warrantless governmental surveillance.
People v. Triggs
On December 19, 1970, plainclothed police officers observed Le-
roy Triggs enter a public restroom in Arroyo Seco Park in Los Angeles.
About ten minutes later David Crockett entered the same restroom. The
police then entered a plumbing access room located in the same build-
ing between the men's and women's restrooms. Officer Richard Ald-
ahl took a position of vantage in this area, some eight feet from the
floor, overlooking the stalls in the men's restroom. Through a vent
immediately above the latrines, the officer observed Triggs orally cop-
1. J. WAMmAuag, Tus NEW CENTURIONS 198 (1970).
2. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
[5751
ulating Crockett in one of the doorless toilet stalls. Triggs and Crock-
ett were both arrested and charged with violating section 288a of the
California Penal Code.
4
At the preliminary hearing Officer Aldahl, the only witness, testi-
fied that he neither knew defendant Triggs nor had he any reason to
suspect that a crime would be committed. He admitted that the police
had no probable cause for an arrest or search before entering the
plumbing access area, and he conceded that observations of this type
were commonly made "in case there was a crime committed." 5  The
defendant moved to have the evidence so obtained suppressed 6 on the
grounds that this method of observation violated his constitutional right
to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures."7  The evidence
was admitted and Triggs was tried and convicted. He appealed. The
California Supreme Court concluded that the search had, in fact, been
illegal and reversed the judgment.
8
The court based its decision on two independent grounds. First,
it found that the search violated petitioner's constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 9  Second, it found the
means of observation to be in violation of California Penal Code section
653n.10 It should be emphasized that these two rationales were treated
separately by the court, and they are completely independent of one
another." It is, moreover, the existence of this second rationale based
upon a California statute which makes its constitutional counterpart so
compelling.
The second independent basis for the decision in People v. Triggs
is less than innovative, for it merely affirms the rationale of People
v. Metcalf. 2 In Metcalf, the court of appeals reversed the defendant's
4. CAL. PEN. CODE § 288a (West 1970) prohibits "an act of copulating the
mouth of one person with the sexual organ of another."
5. People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 889, 506 P.2d 232, 235, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408,
411 (1973).
6. Petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed pursuant to CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 1538.5 (West 1970) and the information set aside pursuant to CAL. PEN. CODE § 995
(West 1970).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. For the full text of the
Fourth Amendment see note 37 infra.
8. People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
9. The search was found to violate both the California State and Federal Consti-
tutions. Id. at 891-92 n.5, 506 P.2d at 237 n.5, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 413 n.5.
10. "Any person who installs or who maintains . . . any two-way mirror permit-
ting observation of any restroom, toilet, bathroom . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor."
CAL. PEN. CODE § 653n (West 1970).
11. Compare People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 884-93, 506 P.2d 232, 232-38, 106
Cal. Rptr. 408, 408-414 (1973), with id. at 893-95, 506 P.2d at 238-39, 106 Cal. Rptr.
at 414-15.
12. 22 Cal. App. 3d 20, 98 Cal. Rptr. 925 (1971).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
February 1974] PRIVACY IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
conviction under a set of facts virtually identical to the Triggs case by
finding section 653n of the Penal Code 3 to be reflective of a legislative
intent to prohibit clandestine observations of public restrooms. The
court concluded by saying that "[tjhe method of surveillance employed
in this case, in our opinion, violates the spirit and policy considerations
which led to the enactment of section 653n and therefore should not
be given this court's sanction."'1 4  By merely affirming the rationale
of the Metcalf decision, the California Supreme Court did little more
than read the statute 5 in the spirit in which it was written.
What is interesting in this regard, however, is not the existence
of this second rationale in Triggs, but rather the presence of the first.
The court went to great lengths to base its decision not only upon
the California statute, but also upon both the California and Federal
Constitutions.' 6  This constitutional approach might at first appear un-
necessary, for the second rationale, based on the state statute, was suffi-
cient in itself to curtail once and for all this method of police surveil-
lance of public restrooms. With a definitive statement by the California
Supreme Court that section 653n of the Penal Code applied to this
type of factual situation, clandestine police observations of public rest-
rooms in California would have been unqualifiably terminated. As
such, the first rationale in Triggs is not required to meet the ends
of this limited fact situation. One thus may ask why the court engaged
in a detailed development of the constitutional rationale.
The California Supreme Court had previously considered the ques-
tion of clandestine police surveillance of public restrooms in 1962 when
it decided Bielicki v. Superior Court 7 and Britt v. Superior Court.'8
The evidence in those cases was suppressed because the defendant's pri-
vacy had been violated unreasonably. While there are similarities be-
tween those cases and the Triggs decision, this note will analyze how,
if at all, the court's reasoning has changed, and where, if anywhere, it is
going.' 9 Specifically, Triggs will be analyzed in order to determine
13. CAL. PEN. CODE § 653n (West 1970); see note 10 supra & note 15 infra.
14. People v. Metcalf, 22 Cal. App. 3d 20, 23, 98 Cal. Rptr. 925, 927 (1971).
15. CAL. PEN. CODE § 653n (West 1970) defines "two way mirror" as follows:
"[A] mirror or other surface which permits any person on one side thereof to see
through it under certain conditions of lighting, while any person on the other side
thereof or other surface at the time can see only the usual mirror or other surface re-
flection."
16. See note 9 supra.
17. 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962).
18. 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962).
19. Because both the court and the author have no doubt as to the impropriety
of this type of police surveillance, the outcome of the case will not be questioned. The
feelings of both were effectively summarized in Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d
626, 636-37, 511 P.2d 33, 41, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 593 (1973), where the court said:
"Surely our state and federal Constitutions and the cases interpreting them foreclose
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if there are any conceptual innovations or expansions in the area of
the definition of personal privacy, particularly with regard to the effect
that this definition may have on search and seizure law.
Background: Right to Privacy
Constitutional Basis
Although the United States Constitution does not expressly men-
tion any right of privacy, an implied right has been articulated in a
variety of sources.20 The Court's statement in Union Pacific Railway
Co. v. Botsford,21 could be said to be the earliest expression of an im-
plied constitutional right to privacy:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interfer-
ence of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.
22
The right has been directly attributed to the Constitution through inter-
pretations of the First Amendment,23 the Fourth Amendment,24 the
Fifth Amendment, 5 the Fourth and Fifth Amendments together,2" the
Ninth Amendment, 27 and the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights. 28 Thus
the right to privacy,29 while not specifically mentioned in the Constitu-
a regression into an Orwellian society in which a citizen, in order to preserve a modi-
cum of privacy, would be compelled to encase himself in a light-tight, air-proof box.
The shadow of 1984 has fortunately not yet fallen upon us."
20. See, e.g., W. DOUGLAS, A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS 30-33 (1961); Beaney, The
Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962, Sup. Cr. REv. 212.
21. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
22. Id. at 251.
23. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (right to receive information
and ideas); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (privacy in one's associa-
tions).
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (right of personal security); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (individual privacy).
25. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (right of
each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life).
26. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (right to be let alone); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life). The Boyd case held that the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments overlap each other and that their doctrines "apply to
all invasions, on the part of the government and its employes .... ".116 U.S. at
630.
27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(right of privacy in marriage).
28. Id. at 485 (zone of privacy).
29. The subjective meaning of this right will not be an issue here, whether it
be "the right to be let alone," Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy 4 HARv.
L. Rav. 193, 195 (1890), or the "control we have over information about ourselves."
Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968).
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tion, has been found to be implicit in many of its provisions and its
general philosophic background,30 and it has been credited by one jus-
tice as being "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized men." 31
In Griswold v. Connecticut,3 2 Mr. Justice Douglas found that the
guarantees of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments
collectively created zones of privacy. In ruling that a Connecticut stat-
ute which prohibited the use of contraceptives violated the right of mar-
ital privacy, the Court established that there does exist a general consti-
tutional right of privacy 3 which lies "within the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."34
However, when examining the problem of governmental investiga-
tive functions the courts have employed a much narrower scope. In
those cases where governmental intrusions have been for the purpose
of detecting or obtaining evidence of criminal activity, the courts have
been very selective in their choice of constitutional applications and
have not relied on the nebulous right to privacy upon which Griswold
is based. They have sought, in fact, to define the defendant's rights
by relying principally on the protections of the Fourth Amendment,
and, more specifically, on its guarantee against "unreasonable searches
and seizures."3 5
The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states by the due proc-
ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,36 prohibits government
agents from conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures. 37  This
30. Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 (1960).
31. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
32. 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
33. Id. at 485.
34. Id. This emphasis on the Fourth Amendment protection is acceptable for
investigative functions, but its inapplicability to other problems concerning the right
to privacy, even in the criminal law sphere, is obvious. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion statutes held unconstitutional).
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States said that, "Mhe Fourth Amendment
cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy."' 389 U.S. 347,
350 (1967).
35. See Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, 980 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Private Places] where the author concludes: "It also seems unlikely that official
investigative activity threatening personal privacy can be subsumed under any Constitu-
tional provision other than the fourth amendment."
36. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
amendment was initially construed as protecting what were deemed to
be "constitutionally protected areas,' 1 8 thus reflecting the amendment's
implicit emphasis on property interests.3 9  It was felt that before there
could be a search, there had to be some sort of physical penetration
of a protected area. This approach originated with Olmstead v. United
States,40 which concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained by tele-
phone wiretaps. The court held that since the telephone projected
the words outside of the house, the wiretap had entailed no intrusion
into the house. In the absence of physical invasion, there was no
search and seizure. In Goldman v. United States,4 the Court reaffirmed
-this rationale when it held that a wall microphone intercepting conversa-
tions in the adjacent room did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Thus the principle emerged that before there could be a search there
had to be some sort of physical trespass into a protected area.42  This
principle is referred to as the trespass doctrine.43
With this early reading of the guarantee, it was only natural that
any extensions or liberalization of the concept would come in terms
of an expansion of what was considered to be a constitutionally pro-
tected area. For this reason the courts began to interpret the language
of the amendment, which protected people "in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects . . . Many of the early variations from the
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized."
See also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. In People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 438,
282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955), the California Supreme Court stated that the "guarantee of
personal privacy" set forth in article I, section 19 of the California Constitution is
"essentially identical" to the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment.
38. This term first appeared in United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 314 (2d
Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
39. Perhaps because the language of the amendment seems to stress the property
aspects of the guarantee, primary emphasis was originally placed on protecting the
property interests of the owner or possessor of the place searched. Comment, Clandes-
tine Police Surveillance of Public Toilet Booth Held to be Unreasonable Search, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 955, 956 (1963).
40. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
41. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
42. Concomitant with the enunciation of the "trespass doctrine," see note 43 and
accompanying text infra, came the rule that only tangible objects could be the subject
of an illegal search and seizure. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
This rule held, in effect, that words alone could not be the subject of a search. This
doctrine, however, was renounced implicitly in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961), and explicitly in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
43. For the ends to which the Court had previously gone to find such an intru-
sion, see Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964), rev'g sub nom. Clinton v. Common-
wealth, 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963).
44. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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letter of the amendment came in terms of expansion of the meaning
of the word "houses."4  Thus areas which were considered to be pro-
tected under the Fourth Amendment came to include virtually any en-
closed place, such as an office,46 a store,47 a hotel room,48 a ware-
house,40 a garage,50 a shed. 1 In turn, nonenclosed places were held
not to be private." This rigid definitional framework, however, could
not withstand the type of searches which emerged with technological
sophistication,53 particularly involving the use of electronic eavesdrop-
ping devices,54 and so a new test was announced in Katz v. United
States.55
45. The traditional approach in determining the constitutionality of a particular
search and seizure has been to decide three distinct issues: first, whether the place
searched was a "house" or other protected area within the meaning of the amendment;
second, whether there was, in fact, a search; and third, whether that search was unrea-
sonable. Comment, Unreasonable Visual Observations Held to Violate Fourth Amend-
ment, 55 MwNN. L. Rav. 1255, 1256 (1971).
46. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921).
47. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1921).
48. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1951).
49. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 542-43 (1967).
50. United States v. Hayden, 140 F. Supp. 429, 435-36 (D. Md. 1956).
51. Walker v. United States, 125 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1942). Other protected
places have included a sealed letter, Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877), and
a desk, United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
52. Thus the "open fields" doctrine of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924), held that trespass onto land did not preclude the police from seizing illegal
alcohol which was in an open field. The Court implied that the scope of privacy
was limited to the house itself. The Hester "open fields" doctrine has been applied
by many lower federal courts decisions in upholding the legality of a search or seizure.
See, e.g., McDowell v. United States, 383 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1967).
53. For a consideration of these innovations see A. WasTN, PuIVAcy Am FREE-
DOM 66-89 (1967); Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for
the 1970's, 66 COLTJM. L. REv. 1003 & 1205 (1969) (Parts I & II). One author stated:
"The trespass approach. . . was an attempt to apply a rigid property concept to prob-
lems arising from technological advances enabling substantial invasions of personal se-
curity without violation of property rights." Private Places, supra note 35, at 972.
54. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Justice Harlan, in a concur-
ring opinion, urging that Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (upholding
electronic surveillance accomplished without physical penetration of the premises), be
overruled, said: "Its limitation on Fourth Amendment protection is, in the present day,
bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated
by electronic as well as physical invasion." 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
55. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also Note, Police Use of Remote Camera Systems
for Surveillance of Public Streets, 4 COLUM. HumAN RIGHTS L. REv. 143, 181-82
(1972) where the authors conclude that in Katz: "The Supreme Court was impelled by
the rapid advance of extra-sensory auditory equipment (used by law enforcement agen-
cies to penetrate individual security without physical presence) to conclude that if an in-
dividual's security from arbitrary police intrusion was to be maintained, the protections
of the Fourth Amendment would have to be triggered by concerns other than property
rights or the existence of physical intrusion."
The Katz Decision
In Katz v. United States5 the United States Supreme Court finally
shifted the emphasis of the privacy concept from "constitutionally pro-
tected areas"57 to personal security. The Court held that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,""8 and proposed a new test
for defining the constitutional right of privacy as protected by that
amendment. The Court held, in effect, that the standard for determin-
ing what is an illegal search is whether defendant's "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy was violated by unreasonable governmental intru-
sion."" This new test embodied a primarily subjective element, with
the abstract considerations of "protected areas" becoming merely one
of the variables to be considered.
Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion in Katz, proposed what
has come to be accepted as the test for a "reasonable expectation of
privacy." He wrote:
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior deci-
sions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as "reasonable."6' 0
Viewed in this light the nature of the place became only one of the
variables involved in the determination of reasonableness. Nonetheless,
the essence of the test was on the subjective expectations and their rea-
sonableness.
The Court went on to imply that the reasonableness test hinges
on the means of surveillance from which the defendant sought protec-
tion. Thus, for example, the expectation of privacy might be reason-
able in terms of the auditory sense, although unreasonable in terms
of the visual sense. In Katz, the defendant sought to exclude evidence
obtained by "bugging" a glass-enclosed public phone booth. The
Court noted that:
[W]hat he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not
the intruding eye-it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his
right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place
where he might be seen.61
56. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
57. The Court explicitly rejected the "constitutionally protected areas" formulation
of the issue. Id. at 350.
58. Id. at 351.
59. See People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 1104, 458 P.2d 713, 718, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 638 (1969). See also Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
60. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
61. Id. at 352.
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The Court, in effect, held that the means of surveillance, visual or audi-
tory, is one variable which must be considered in attempting to deter-
mine whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable.
Katz has been criticized for its lack of guidelines in defining what
constitutes a "reasonable expectation of privacy."'62  But the real
strength of the case comes in its rejection of the trespass doctrine"3
and the realization that privacy is a more personal concept. Moreover,
the court specifically recognized that public or semipublic places could
become private for the purposes of the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
64
Search and Seizure
Privacy and Plain View
A search is defined as an invasion into, or a seeking out of, some-
thing that is hidden.65 The concept of privacy is at its very core, for
there can be no search in a legal sense unless an invasion of privacy
is found.66 Before Katz there could only be a search where there was
an unwarranted invasion of a constitutionally protected area. 7  Simi-
larly, what was not private, what was open and notorious and accessi-
ble to the public, could not be the subject of a search.68 This concept
gave rise to what is called the "plain view doctrine," which holds that
if an observer, usually a police officer, is in a place in which he has
a lawful right to be, then any evidence seized as a result of his visual
62. See Private Places, supra note 35, at 976, where the author praises the dis-
carding of the "four-walls" approach, but adds that "the opinion offers little to fill
the void it has thus created." He goes on to suggest three variables which could be
considered when passing on the question of the reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy: 1) The nature of the intended area of private control. 2) The degree
to which the facility is offered to exclusive and individual use. 3) The degree to which
society honors the intimacy or privacy of the activity normally carried on in such a
place. Id. at 983-84.
61. The Court concluded "that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman [see
text accompanying notes 40 & 41 supral have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions
that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling."
389 U.S. at 353.
64. "But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52.
65. United States v. Marti, 321 F. Supp. 59, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Bielicki v.
Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 605, 371 P.2d 288, 290, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552, 554 (1962).
66. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); United States v. Croft, 429
F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir. 1970); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492
(1963); People v. Tellez, 268 Cal. App. 2d 375, 378, 73 Cal. Rptr. 892, 894 (1968).
67. See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
68. Trujillo v. United States, 294 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1961); Petteway v. United
States, 261 F.2d 53, 54 (4th Cir. 1958); see People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 762,
290 P.2d 855, 858 (1955); cf. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927).
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observations is admissible in court and is not violative of the Fourth
Amendment.6 9
The plain view doctrine arises in two types of cases; 70 first, where
the object is in the open and is subject to view by members of the
public, 1 and second, where the subject's privacy has been lawfully in-
vaded (as in the case of a valid search warrant) and evidence is visi-
ble to the invader. 72  The considerations in this note do not extend to
the first of these types, for there, by definition, privacy has already been
established and legally violated. The plain view doctrine as discussed
here is concerned only with when one's privacy is protected. 3
The plain view doctrine and privacy may be viewed as at odds
with each other in terms of search and seizure law. When privacy
was originally defined in terms of "constitutionally protected areas" the
two concepts were mutually exclusive by definition. That is, before
Katz v. United States,74 the plain view doctrine meant that constitu-
tional questions could not arise even if a government agent was able
to observe the act or person from a place where the public could make
the same observation, a public place.7" Recall that prior to Katz there
could be no legal privacy unless one was in a place which was not
observable to the public, a totally enclosed place. 6  Because such
places were not open and notorious, events within them could not be
observed from a public place. Thus, the two legal concepts were at
that time mutually exclusive and compatible. As long as privacy was
defined in terms of enclosed places one was never required to choose
between the two. However, with its new definition of privacy, Katz
had a twofold effect on the open and notorious concept of the plain
view doctrine.
The principal effect of the Katz decision on the plain view doc-
trine was to limit its scope by determining the application of the open
and notorious concept by reference to the particular means of surveil-
69. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
70. Rintamaki, Plain View Searching, 60 MirT. L. REv. 25, 44 (1973); Annot.,
48 A.L.R.3d 1178, 1183-84 (1973).
71. See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927); Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924).
72. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971).
73. The concern of this note is with when the privacy protection will attach.
The open and notorious concept of the plain view doctrine will, if applicable, preclude
the finding of a search altogether. For this reason it is important to note that there
is a broader concept of plain view than is expressed in some of the cases, but the
majority of cases restrict its application to those situations where a search is already
in progress. See, e.g., id. at 466-67.
74. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
75. See Rintamaki, Plain View Searching, 60 MrLrr. L. REv. 25, 44 (1973).
76. See text accompanying notes 44-55 supra.
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lance employed. Thus, if the means of surveillance is auditory, but
the conduct is only open and notorious visually, then the plain view
doctrine will not legally justify the surveillance. Katz, as noted ear-
lier,77 extended the concept of privacy based on the means of surveil-
lance. The Court held that a reasonable expectation of privacy was
not limited to conduct taking place within fully enclosed places, but
might also hinge on whether the particular sense involved was one for
which there was such an expectation. Thus, there was found to be
a reasonable expectation of auditory privacy in Katz because the de-
fendant had sealed off the auditory function from the public by closing
the telephone booth door behind him. On the other hand, there was
found to be no reasonable expectation of visual privacy because the
defendant was located where any member of the public could readily
see him. 78  What the Court said, therefore, was that the auditory func-
tion was private because it was not open and notorious, while the visual
function was not private because the act took place in plain view of
anyone passing by. No longer could privacy be negated simply by
finding a general openness, but rather only by finding an openness
to the particular means of surveillance employed.
79
The second effect of Katz on the plain view doctrine was less defi-
nitive. Because of the subjective basis for the reasonable expectation
of privacy test, the privacy and plain view doctrines were rendered in-
compatible, that is, they were no longer mutually exclusive.8 0 Privacy
was to be determined by subjective criteria, but plain view was still
couched in terms of abstract criteria,81 namely, whether the place is
open to surveillance by the public. As a result, there arose an inherent
inconsistency in their legal definitions, for one could conceivably have
a reasonable expectation of privacy yet still be legally spied upon based
on plain view.82  This meant, in effect, that after the Katz decision
77. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
78. Before Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the openness of the booth
in a visual sense would have been sufficient in itself to negate a finding of privacy
based on constitutionally protected areas.
79. It is important to realize here that the test for privacy after Katz was largely
subjective, and as such the mere openness of the place would not necessarily have been
determinative in itself. However, the courts continued long after Katz to consider this
the main variable. See text accompanying notes 129-33 infra.
80. This may be largely due to the fact that Katz was decided with auditory sur-
veillance in mind, for that was the factual situation before the Court. Unfortunately,
the reasonable expectation of privacy test was not so easily applied in the area of visual
surveillance.
81. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
82. The potential conflict between the plain view an privacy doctrines, even after
Katz, was reflected in a number of cases involving observations made with binoculars.
In those cases where observations were made from a distance by means of some kind
of visual aid, the courts were reluctant to apply the Katz rationale. Thus, in Common-
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there was an implicit contradiction between the legal concepts of pri-
vacy and plain view.
This conflict manifested itself in the restroom cases in California, 3
where a variation of the plain view doctrine was developed. This varia-
tion held that as long as the public could have seen the person or objects
observed, it made no difference how the police observed the same evi-
dence, for there could be no privacy. Although this idea arose in cases
before Katz,"4 its appearance in cases after Katz"3 indicates the courts'
misconception of that case. The California Supreme Court in Triggs
attempts to resolve the conflict between the plain view doctrine and
the reasonable expectation of privacy test by assessing the plain view
wealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177, 180-82, 263 A.2d 904, 906-07 (1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971), the court held that the defendant had no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy because he had failed to sufficiently manifest such an expectation.
The court did not address itself to the second of Harlan's criteria, that the expectation
be one that society will recognize as reasonable. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
In effect, the use of an artificial method for visual surveillance was not considered
by the courts to be enough, by itself, to preclude the search from being justified on
the basis of the plain view doctrine. A similar result was reached in Fullbright v.
United States where the court said: "Mhe use of binoculars did not change the char-
acter or admissibility of the evidence or information gained." 392 F.2d 432, 434 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968).
It should be noted, however, that there was language by the Supreme Court prior
to Katz which would have indicated that in these situations a reasonable expectation
could be found: "The use of bifocals, field glasses or the telescope to magnify the object
of a witness' vision is not a forbidden search or seizure even if focused without one's
knowledge or consent upon what he supposes to be private indiscretions." On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952) (emphasis added). On Lee was quoted favor-
ably in Fullbright; however, the language in On Lee going to the subjective element
was ignored, and no such expectation of privacy was found.
The potential effect of Katz upon these types of visual surveillance did not, how-
ever, go unnoticed. In two separate opinions in Commonwealth v. Hernley, two judges
indicated their awareness of the Katz rationale: "I would not decide, however, whether
the search conducted violated privacy which appellees reasonably expected to exist."
216 Pa. Super. 177, 182, 263 A.2d 904, 907 (1970) (Hoffman, J., concurring). "Katz
v. United States . . . if extended from the auditory into the optical sphere, [would]
outlaw hidden movie or television cameras close to the unsuspecting citizen." Id. at
183, 263 A.2d at 908 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
It would appear, therefore, that although the Supreme Court in Katz resolved an
apparent clash between privacy and plain view by distinguishing on the basis of the
means of surveillance, the courts thereafter were loath to do the same thing where the
same apparent clash arose over the method of surveillance. See note 155 and accom-
panying text infra.
83. See cases cited note 117 infra.
84. In fact, the idea was derived directly from the 1962 California Supreme Court
cases of Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1962), and Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849
(1962). See text accompanying notes 97-99 infra. See also text accompanying notes
119-28 infra.
85. See text accompanying notes 129-34 infra.
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concept not only in terms of the means of observation, as in Katz, but
also in terms of the method by which the observation was carried out. 8
Restroom Surveillance: Early California Cases
The problem of police surveillance of public restrooms in Califor-
nia has provided an opportunity to reflect upon the growth, applicabil-
ity, and the confusion associated with the right to privacy and, more
specifically, the Fourth Amendment. In a unique series of decisions
s7
the California courts to a great extent have anticipated and have ex-
panded upon the concept of this protection. However, they have not
always proceeded in the clearest fashion. Because of the confusion cre-
ated by some of these opinions, they have often been credited with
something they did not propound, or have been criticized for ignoring
what in retrospect appears significant. 8   Moreover, there is language
in some of these decisions which has been falsely credited with foresha-
dowing later developments.8" It is this suspect element of foresight,
along with the misplaced accredation, which set the stage for, and in
fact required, the People v. Triggs decision.
Bielicki and Britt
In 1962 the California Supreme Court decided two cases concern-
ing police surveillance of public restrooms. In both Bielicki v. Superior
Court9" and Britt v. Superior Court,91 the evidence seized was eventu-
ally held inadmissible due to violations by the police of the California
Constitution and United States Constitution, specifically the guarantees
86. Compare text accompanying notes 78-79 supra, with text accompanying notes
135-70 infra.
87. The California "restroom cases" cover a span of eleven years and include
three Supreme Court and seven Appellate Court decisions. People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d
884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973); Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469,
374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962); Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602,
371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962); People v. Metcalf, 22 Cal. App. 3d 20, 98
Cal. Rptr. 925 (1971); People v. Crafts, 13 Cal. App. 3d 457, 91 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1970);
People v. Heath, 266 Cal. App. 2d 754, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968); People v. Roberts,
256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967); People v. Maldonado, 240 Cal. App.
2d 812, 50 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1966); People v. Young, 214 Cal. App. 2d 131, 29 Cal. Rptr.
492 (1963); People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1962). To
date only one other state supreme court has addressed the particular issue. State v.
Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970). See also Brown v. State, 3 Md. App.
90, 238 A.2d 147 (1969); State v. Coyle, 181 So. 2d 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
Federal cases include Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966) and Poore v. Ohio, 243 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
88. See note 107 and accompanying text infra.
89. See note 145 and accompanying text infra.
90. 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962).
91. 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962).
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against "unreasonable searches and seizures. '92
In Bielicki, the officer observed the interior of a fully enclosed
toilet stall through a pipe in the roof. By his own admission the officer
had neither reasonable cause to arrest the defendant prior to the obser-
vation, nor any grounds tor suspect that a crime was being committed.
Apparently this procedure for observing the occupants of the stalls was
followed regularly and officers would remain on the roof "[u]ntil we
make an arrest, or until we see that we can't make an arrest. '93
The court first determined the visual invasion to be a search.94
It then held that search to be unreasonable95 due to the lack of a search
warrant and the general exploratory nature of the surveillance. Since
the officer spied on everyone using the facility, the surveillance was
characterized as an exploratory search, and as such was condemned.9"
The court added that, because the observation had revealed activities
"which no member of the public could have seen,"'97 there was
no implied consent to the intrusion.98 By so holding, however, the
court implied the contrary; that if the public could have seen the de-
fendant's acts then he would have implicitly consented to the observa-
tion and thus waived his right of privacy. 91
Fearing that Bielicki would receive too restrictive a reading, 100
five months later the California Supreme Court decided Britt v. Su-
92. See note 37 supra.
93. Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 604, 371 P.2d 288, 289, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 552, 553 (1962).
94. Id. at 605, 371 P.2d at 289, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
95. Id. at 605-06, 371 P.2d at 289, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 554. The Constitution pro-
hibits only those searches that are unreasonable. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 60 (1950); People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (1956). Each
case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. E.g., United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950); People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 506, 297 P.2d
451, 456 (1956).
96. 57 Cal. 2d at 606, 371 P.2d 289, 21 Cal. Rptr. 554. General exploratory
searches are condemned by both federal courts, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932); United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 950 (1958), and state courts, e.g., People v. Schaumloffel, 53 Cal. 2d 96, 100-
01, 346 P.2d 393, 396 (1959); People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 378, 303 P.2d 721,
724 (1956).
97. Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 607, 371 P.2d 288, 291, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 552, 555 (1962).
98. 57 Cal. 2d at 606, 371 P.2d at 289, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 554. Consent makes a
search reasonable. See, e.g., People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 2d 45, 49, 301 P.2d 241, 243
(1956); People v. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751, 753, 290 P.2d 852, 853-54 (1955).
99. The court did not use the term "right of privacy" until the end of the decision
where it discusses and rejects the possibility of the owner's consent validating the
search. Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 609, 371 P.2d 288, 292, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 552, 556 (1962).
100. People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 889, 506 P.2d 232, 235, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408,
411 (1973).
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perior Court.10 1 In this case the co-urt was confronted with a factual
situation substantially identical to the Bielicki case.10 2  The observing
officer, without probable cause, surveilled the interior of the public toi-
let stalls from a hidden vantage point. Each stall was enclosed by three
walls and a door. However, the partitions between the stalls began
eight to ten inches above the floor, thus affording a limited perspective
of what was taking place inside the stalls. In fact, the prohibited act
was committed by means of that open space beneath the partition be-
tween two adjacent stalls. The court commented:
[Tihe act committed in the present case might possibly have been
visible-at least to some extent-had the officer been observing
from a public, common use portion of the restroom .... 103
Again the court found the toilet stall to be a private place based
upon the protected areas concept, and again the court condemned the
general exploratory nature of the search. In rejecting a plea that the
crucial fact in Bielicki was the "nature of the place," 104 the court said:
The crucial fact in Bielicki was neither the manner of observation
alone nor the place of commission alone, but rather the manner
in which the police observed a place-and persons in that place-
which is ordinarily understood to afford personal privacy to in-
dividual occupants. 10 5
This language is deceptive for two reasons. First, despite the use
of the words "ordinarily understood to afford personal privacy,"10
which strongly imply the subjective element appearing later in Katz
v. United States, 0 7 the court was still stressing the concept of private
places, as opposed to personal privacy, for it went on to say that the
police may not "surreptitiously invade the right of personal privacy of
persons in private places.'11 8  Second, the court used the term "man-
101. 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962).
102. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
103. Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 473, 374 P.2d 817, 819, 24 Cal. Rptr.
849, 851 (1962) (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 472, 374 P.2d at 818-19, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 850-51. By arguing that the
determinative factor in Britt was that the act was partially observable to the public,
the prosecution attempted, indirectly, to keep the protected areas concept intact. See
text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
105. Id. at 472, 374 P.2d at 819, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
106. Id.
107. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). This language has been credited for foreshadowing the
Katz rationale. See Comment, Unreasonable Visual Observations Held to Violate
Fourth Amendment, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1255, 1259 (1971). But whether the court in
Britt in fact anticipated the subjective aspect of privacy for which Katz is now noted
(see text accompanying notes 56-61 supra) is of purely academic interest, for the courts
certainly did not construe Britt as relying on any doctrine other than the protected
areas rationale used previously. See text accompanying notes 119-28 infra.
108. 58 Cal. 2d at 472, 374 P.2d at 819, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 851 (emphasis added).
ner"'10 9 to refer to the general exploratory nature of the search and not
to the clandestine nature of the observation. Britt stressed that the
nature of the search, whether it is general and exploratory, is also to
be considered. The court, therefore, was utilizing a two pronged test
for the reasonableness of public restroom surveillance. First, the place
had to be private because only private places could be the subject of
an unlawful search. 110 Second, the observation must be of the general
exploratory type, hence unreasonable."'
It seems apparent that the Bielicki and Britt decisions, taken to-
gether, were really attacking the clandestine nature of the observations.
However, due to the requirement at the time of these decisions, that
there first be a finding of privacy before there could be a search, these
cases focused primarily on the protected areas concept. The signifi-
cance of the Bielicki and Britt decisions is the expansion of that doc-
rine to include public places.
But while the Bielicki and Britt decisions may have had the clan-
destine nature of the police observations as their target, they could not
attack the surveillance on that basis.1 2  Rather, because there first had
109. Id.
110. The early cases concerning privacy did not speak in terms of private places
per se, but in effect that was what was being considered prior to Katz. See text accom-
panying notes 44-52 supra. After the Katz decision the test was truly in terms of
personal privacy. See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
111. Only one case concerning public restroom surveillance in California found
there to have been a reasonable search, as opposed to People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App.
2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1962) and People v. Crafts, 13 Cal. App. 3d 457, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 563 (1970) which found there to have been no search at all. See text accom-
panying notes 118-27 infra. In Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 255-56 (9th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966), the court held that there had been a
search, and that it had been reasonable, primarily because it had entailed no trespass.
This case has been severely criticized, and was implicitly overruled by Katz. See Note,
Fourth Amendment Application to Semi-Public Areas: Smayda v. United States, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 835 (1966); Note, Constitutional Law'-Clandestine Surveillance of Public
Toilet-Not An Unreasonable Search, 19 VAND. L. REV. 945 (1966); Comment, Police
Surveillance of Public Toilets, 23 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 423 (1966).
112. There is language in Britt which has been credited with making such a dis-
tinction, see note 126 infra, for the court there concluded: "[Wihile the act committed
in the present case might possibly have been visible . . .had the officer been observing
from a public, common use portion of the restroom, the fact remains that he was not
so stationed and the subject evidence was not so obtained; rather, it was discovered
solely by means of the just described impermissible search, and hence was inadmissible
under the settled law of this state." 58 Cal. 2d at 473, 374 P.2d at 819, 24 Cal. Rptr.
at 819. This quote, by itself, could be read either of two ways. First, that the clan-
destine nature of the search is the determinative factor, regardless of the visibility of
the act from the common area. Or second, that because there has already been found
to have been an illegal search, the observation point is not a question to be considered.
This latter interpretation appears the correct one, for not only does this language ap-
pear at the end of the opinion as dicta, but also, if "the just described impermissible
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to be a determination that privacy existed, those cases focused on ex-
panding the protected areas approach to include semipublic restrooms
within the definition of privacy. Once this privacy was established,
the searches were condemned based upon their general exploratory na-
ture, not upon their clandestine nature.
Once privacy was established the plain view doctrine was, by defi-
nition, not applicable, regardless of how the officers managed to ob-
serve the activities.113 This change was reflected in Bielicki by the fact
that although the officers were in a place in which they had a right
to be and did view the acts first-hand, there was found to be privacy
and an unreasonable search. Bielicki specifically rejected the applica-
bility of the plain view doctrine when the court said:
[l]t is undisputed that the activities of petitioners witnessed by
Officer Hetzel were not "in plain sight" or "readily visible and ac-
cessible," but rather were hidden from all but the type of ex-
ploratory search here conducted. 114
It must be remembered, however, that the court directly implied
that if the public could have seen the proscribed act of defendant, then
the observations would have been permissible and not violative of the
Fourth Amendment." 5 In effect, the court said that if the public could
see in, then there would be no privacy, and the plain view concept
would be applicable." 6 Later cases read this to mean that if the public
could see in then the plain view concept was automatically applica-
ble,' 17 thus eliminating the initial determination of privacy based on
protected areas.
Early California Appellate Court Cases
If Britt and Bielicki were actually aimed at curtailing clandestine
surveillances, the California Courts have not consistently manifested a
search" refers to the vantage point, the reasoning is circular. Language in Smayda
v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), indicates that the Ninth Circuit had
arrived at the same conclusion: "No case has yet stretched the Fourth Amendment
to make its restrictions applicable to a clandestine observation, by officers of the law,
of what goes on in a public place." Id. at 255.
113. The position of the officer for purposes of the plain view doctrine is not
in itself determinative. The principle inquiry is whether or not the act or object was
really in plain view. Thus, if the officer is not legally positioned the plain view justi-
fication will be automatically negated, but the fact that he is lawfully in that position
will not in itself determine the legality of the search.
114. 57 Cal. 2d at 607, 371 P.2d at 291, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 555 (citations omitted).
115. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
116. Thus the rule in California that "looking through a window does not consti-
tute an unreasonable search...." People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 762, 290 P.2d
855, 858 (1955).
117. See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967);
People v. Maldonado, 240 Cal. App. 2d 812, 50 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1966).
desire to limit surveillance of this type. One line of cases, 118 beginning
with People v. Norton,"9 held that evidence obtained through clandes-
tine observations of public restrooms might be admissible. Norton held
that because the toilet stall in which the act took place lacked a door,
the case was distinguishable from Bielicki; hence, there was no right
of privacy.'2 0 The court reasoned that the right had been waived when
the defendant performed the act in a place where any member of the
public could readily observe it. 2' Because the public could have seen
the act, the police could also have seen it, and the "critical circumstance
of 'privacy of place' [was] not present .... ,22 The court was clearly
relying on the protected areas approach when it stated:
Thus, in our view, the factual essence in Bielicki was the clandestine
observation by the police of a place which by its very physical
appointments provided privacy to its occupant.'
23
Other cases following this tack also distinguished Bielicki and
Britt by emphasizing that there the acts were not observable to the pub-
lice,' 24 while in these cases the acts were observable to the public.'
25
What is important to stress with regard to this series of cases is that
they distinguish the earlier California Supreme Court decisions on their
facts, and in doing so reflect the early emphasis on protected areas.
These cases never reached the issue of the clandestine nature of the
observation 26 because, like Bielicki and Britt, they first concerned
118. See note 117 supra.
119. 209 Cal, App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1962).
120. Id. at 175, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 677. Norton was decided without reference to
the Britt decision. The reason for this omission is not entirely clear, but it may
rest on the fact that Britt was decided on Oct. 2, 1962, while Norton was decided
on Oct. 31, 1962. Perhaps the Norton court had not yet seen the Britt decision. The
supreme court denied Norton a hearing on Dec. 26, 1962.
121. Id. at 176, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 175, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 677 (emphasis added).
124. These later cases, see note 125 infra, unlike Norton, distinguished Britt as
well as Bielicki. But the addition of the Britt case, see note 120 supra, did little to
alter the course of these appellate court decisions. Because there was a door on the
toilet stall in Britt, the case may be closer factually to Bielicki, where the stall was
completely enclosed, than to Norton, where there was no door at all. That is, the
public really could not have observed the activity within the stall in the Britt case,
while in the subsequent court of appeals cases there was no question but that the pub-
lic could have observed the illegal conduct.
125. See, e.g., People v. Crafts, 13 Cal. App. 3d 457, 91 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1970)
(act performed by urinals, visible to anyone entering); People v. Heath, 266 Cal. App.
2d 754, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968) (act performed in doorless stall); People v. Roberts,
256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967) (act done in open area).
126. People v. Crafts, 13 Cal. App. 3d 457, 91 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1970), did concern
itself with the question of the effect of the clandestine vantage point on the search.
Crafts read Britt as indicating that the determination might be conclusive, but it re-
jected the rationale because it felt that the supreme court, by denying petitions for
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themselves with whether the place was private. Upon finding that the
place was not private, all further inquiry ceased. Such an analysis is
entirely consistent with the approach taken in Bielicki and Britt.
Moreover, these decisions perceived the rule in Bielicki and Britt
to hinge solely on the ability of the public to observe the illegal acts.
This approach was, in effect, a meshing of plain view and protected
areas, an equating of unobservable with fully enclosed. This merging
of the two concepts produced an entirely acceptable result for that time,
for the courts merely said that as long as the public could see in, there
was no privacy from any type of observation. This would appear per-
fectly consistent with the pre-Katz definition of privacy.'2 7  But once
the reasonable expectation of privacy test was announed in Katz, the
plain view and privacy doctrines were no longer mutually exclusive.
Resort then had to be made first to establishing the fact of privacy,
then to determining the applicability of plain view.
The case of People v. Heath,2 " discussed below, was decided after
Katz and failed to detect this shift. In fact, the failure of Heath to recog-
nize this difference may have prompted the Triggs decision.
People v. Heath: An Exercise in Form Over Substance?
In People v. Heath,12 9 decided after Katz v. United States,13 0 the
court modified the protected areas approach and began speaking in
terms of an expectation of privacy as the basis for privacy. The court
said that:
The test is not whether a place, in this instance one containing
toilet facilities, is to be regarded as a sanctuary in the abstract,
but rather whether the conduct and reasonable expectations of
the person utilizing such a place entitles him to freedom from ju-
dicially unauthorized surveillance.'
3'
However, the court went on to say that if the expectation is to be con-
sidered reasonable, reference must be made to the nature of the place.
That is, only by considering the physical attributes of the area can one
decide whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable. The fact that
hearings in similar cases, had acquiesced in the previous appellate court decisions. Id.
at 459, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 564. Crafts, it would appear, both misconstrues Britt, see
note 112 supra, and misperceives the intent of the supreme court, for that court in
Triggs specifically rejects the acquiescence conclusion. People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d
884, 890-91, 506 P.2d 232, 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 412 (1973).
127. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
128. 266 Cal. App. 2d 754, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968).
129. Id. People v. Crafts, 13 Cal. App. 3d 457, 91 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1970) was also
decided after Katz. Because it does not mention Heath, Katz, or the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test, it will not be discussed in this note.
130. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
131. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 757, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
the act in Heath was done in a place open to view by the public
was held to indicate "an indifference to public observation,"'132 and the
court concluded that the defendant's expectation was not reasonable.
It is important to note that the privacy in Heath was based, once again,
on the ability of the public to observe the illegal acts. Rather than
considering the clandestine nature of the observation or the subjective
feeling of privacy in a restroom, the court determined the reasonable-
ness of the expectation solely on the ability of the public to observe
the acts in question. In effect, the court used potential visibility as
the sole basis for finding the expectation of privacy unreasonable, in-
stead of using it merely to negate the old test of protected areas. With
either approach the physical attributes of the place are determinative,
but after Katz this factor should no longer be the only determining
one.
In Health, therefore, the physical attributes of the place were ex-
amined in determining that defendant's expectation of privacy was not
reasonable. In previous decisions based on identical facts, 33 the physi-
cal attributes of the place were examined in determining that defendant
had waived his privacy. It would appear that although the new Katz
test for privacy was used in People v. Heath, the results remained the
same because the main emphasis still rested on the character of the
place observed, that is, on the observability of the acts therein. This
emphasis is in reality little more than the protected areas approach,
and to that extent it can be argued that all the decisions are consistent.
Why then, in People v. Triggs,"' where there was no door on the toilet




In People v. Triggs"5 the fact situation was virtually identical to
People v. Heath,'36 and similar to Bielicki v. Superior Court131 and
Britt v. Superior Court. 38  The act took place in a doorless stall of
a public restroom and was observed by the police who had stationed
themselves in a clandestine vantage point. The police had neither
probable cause for arrest nor a search warrant"39 permitting the obser-
132. Id.
133. See cases cited in note 117 supra.
134. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
135. Id.
136. 266 Cal. App. 2d 754, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968).
137. 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962).
138. 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962).
139. Justice Otis in State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 213, 177 N.W.2d 800, 805
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vation. But unlike the court in Heath4 ° the California Supreme Court
in Triggs found that the petitioner did, in fact, have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy which had been unreasonably violated by the
search. 14 1  As a result, the court ruled that the evidence should have
been suppressed and Triggs' conviction was reversed. By what ration-
ale did the court determine that there was an illegal search, when previ-
ous cases, even with the benefit of Katz v. United States, 42 had found
no such illegal intrusion?143 The answer to this question may be found
in the court's conceptualization of a "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy."
The Triggs case appears to rely heavily on Britt and Bielicki for its
rationale,' 44 but despite the similar result, the reasoning is very differ-
ent. 45  Because the 1962 decisions relied on the constitutionally pro-
tected areas test, 46 parts of these decisions were spent explaining why
a public restroom stall was a private place. By doing so, the probable
target of those cases, the clandestine spying on innocent and guilty
alike, was masked in the privacy discussion, and hence largely over-
looked in the subsequent lower court cases. 147  Moreover, because of
the rigid requirements for finding a place to be private, the concept
could not have been expanded easily to other types of public facili-
ties. 48  Even with the advent of Katz, the physical attributes problem
(1970) (dissenting) said "mlt would never be possible to secure a search warrant in
situations of this kind ......
140. 266 Cal. App. 2d 754, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968).
141. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
142. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See text accompanying notes 129-34 supra.
143. In State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970), the court, rely-
ing principally on Katz, but also quoting extensively from Bielicki and Britt, held there
to have been a search in violation of defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy.
But what is most interesting in regard to Triggs is the court's observation that "[tihe
store could have removed the doors if it saw fit, so that anyone using the facilities
would have no expectation of privacy .. " Id. at 211, 177 N.W.2d at 804 (empha-
sis added).
144. People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 889-91, 506 P.2d 232, 235-37, 106 Cal. Rpt.
408, 411-13 (1973).
145. Due to heavy reliance on language from Bielicki and Britt, the Triggs case
appears to be merely a restatement of those earlier decisions, rather than the innovation
that it is. The problem is compounded by the court giving its earlier decisions too
much credit. Thus, for instance, the Triggs case speaks in terms of defendants Bielicki
and Britt as having had reasonable expectations of privacy, where at that time the
courts did not even conceptualize privacy in those terms. While People v. Triggs may
have the same general goal as the 1962 decisions, it certainly does not approach the
problem in the same way, and as such it is doing itself and those involved a grave
disservice by implying that Triggs is little more than an extension of those earlier
cases.
146. See text accompanying notes 110-11 supra.
147. See text accompanying notes 118-22 supra.
148. This problem may have been exacerbated by the nature of the function gen-
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kept reappearing in decisions as the overriding concern,' 49 and as
a result the protection afforded to those using public places was jeo-
pardized by a misconception of the California Supreme Court's purpose
in Britt and Bielicki.
The Triggs case not only attempts to clarify the earlier decisions,
but it also takes them one step further. People v. Triggs reflects the
true spirit of the Katz case by emphasizing the subjective considerations
involved. In Katz, the Supreme Court held that where the petitioner
had sealed himself in a glass phone booth there was an expectation
of privacy regarding his auditory transmissions, although there was no
such expectation as to his visually observable conduct. The Court
held, in effect, that one can have an expectation of privacy which is
reasonable in one form while unreasonable in another. Specifically,
the defendant in Katz had privacy from one means of surveillance,
auditory, but not from another, visual.150 Triggs carries this concept
of the expectation of privacy one step further and reflects its potential
extrapolation by the court's emphasis on the method by which the ob-
servation was carried out.
The Triggs court held that "[t]he expectation of privacy a person
has when he enters a restroom is reasonable and is not diminished or
destroyed because the toilet stall being used lacks a door."'' However,
this expectation of privacy is not the all-or-nothing concept proposed
by People v. Heath.5 2  On the contrary, the Triggs court comments
on the fact that Heath, and the other progeny of Britt and Bielicki,
largely disregarded language in Britt which "placed as much emphasis
on the means of observation as on the place observed . . . .
By objecting to the emphasis of these lower court cases, the court
is again attacking the clandestine nature of the observation as it applies
to the privacy concept. But in this case the court appears to merge
the two pronged test of Bielicki and Britt into a single test by linking
erally performed in public restrooms. That is, the court may have been unusually sus-
ceptible to finding privacy in Triggs because of the subjective nature of the test and
the very private nature of the function under observation. See text accompanhing note
168 infra.
149. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra.
150. See text accompanying note 61 supra. Note that this same rationale would be
applicable to other senses, should such a fact situation ever arise.
151. 8 Cal. 3d at 891, 506 P.2d at 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (1973).
152. In Heath, as in the People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr.
676 (1962) through People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967)
line of cases, privacy was dependent upon the ability of the public to observe. The
place from which the officer actually observed was not a determinative factor. See
text accompanying note 132 supra.
153. 8 Cal. 3d at 890, 506 P.2d at 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (1973). However,
the means language in Britt could just as easily be interpreted as referring to the gen-
eral exploratory nature of the search. See text accompanying note 105-09 supra.
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the expectation of privacy directly to the clandestine nature of the sur-
veillance. When the court comments that "[m]ost persons using public
restrooms have no reason to suspect that a hidden agent of the state
will observe them," '154 it is saying that the occupants have a reasonable
expectation that their privacy will not be violated by hidden agents of
the state. The court is distinguishing observations made from clandes-
tine vantage points from those which are made from the public's point
of view. It is saying that, although the occupant of a publicly observ-
able place may have no expectation of privacy from others who may
openly enter such a place, there certainly is a reasonable expectation
that one will not be secretly observed through a hole in the roof by
governmental agents. The expectation, therefore, becomes much more
of a subjectively selective concept, for even if one does not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy concerning a visual observation, one may
have it based on the clandestine method of observation. 155 In Katz,
the distinction rested on the means of the invasion, namely, whether
it was visual or auditory; in Triggs the distinction is based upon the
method of invasion as clandestine or open. Thus, by finding reason-
able the defendant's expectation that one will not be spied upon from
above, Triggs is attacking the surreptitious nature of the searches, while
leaving intact the now standard definition of privacy. 56
Despite this shift from the protected areas approach to the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy concept, there remains in Triggs the
same three-step analysis which was used to determine the legality of
a search in Bielicki and Britt.'5" In both of these 1962 cases and
Triggs, privacy first had to be found. In the earlier cases it was found
in the nature of the place; in Triggs it rested on an expectation con-
cerning the method of surveillance. Once privacy had been estab-
lished, there was then a finding that there had indeed been a search.
Finally, the search had to be found to be unreasonable. 158  In Britt
and Bielicki the unreasonableness resulted from the general exploratory
nature of the searches; in Triggs it resulted from the clandestine nature
of the searches. It would appear, therefore, that where Triggs and the
earlier California Supreme Court cases diverge is primarily in their defi-
nition of what constitutes privacy. Although it is here that Triggs
154. Id. at 891, 506 P.2d at 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (1973).
155. In Note, Remote Camera Surveillance, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143, 170-
93 (1972), the authors reach a similar conclusion. They find the use of extrasensory
devices to conduct visual surveillances to be a method of observation from which one
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
156. This is to be distinguished from the situation in Katz, where in order to cur-
tail the surreptitious bugging the Court was required to redefine the legal test for per-
sonal privacy.
157. See text accompanying notes 94-104 supra.
158. See note 95 supra.
makes its greatest contribution, the case does fall short of definitively
announcing a new principle.
Like Katz, the Triggs case could be criticized for its lack of defi-
nitional guidelines. 159 That is, aside from saying that the expectation
of privacy in this case was reasonable, the court adds nothing to indicate
how it reached this conclusion. It does say that "[t]he clandestine
observations of restrooms does not fall from the purview of the Fourth
Amendment merely through the removal of toilet stall doors,"' 6 ° but
this certainly does not tell us how the court came to decide that this
selective expectation of privacy was reasonable. Turning to Justice Har-
lan's dual criteria for determining the reasonable expectation of privacy,
which he articulated in Katz,' we see that there remains a large void
requiring some guidelines. That is, the second of Harlan's require-
ments indicated that the expectation of privacy must be one that the
general public will accept as reasonable, and we must know how such
a judicial conclusion is reached. Is this little more than a determination
of what the public would think if a vote were taken, or are there certain
questions to be asked to add a little direction to the investigation? Both
Katz and Triggs leave these questions unanswered.
The strength of the Triggs case is the realization of the selective
element of this expectation, while its weakness is its failure to articulate
further guidelines. When the court says, "[m]ost persons using public
restrooms have no reason to suspect that a hidden agent of the state
will observe them,"' 62 the court is saying where, but not why the expec-
tation attaches. By failing to tell us how it reached this conclusion,
it implicitly leaves the question to societal standards, the second of Har-
lan's criteria. It does not tell us, however, how to determine these
standards nor does it suggest the variables involved.
It could, of course, be argued that this omission was deliberate
and proper. In breaking new ground with its conceptualization of the
selective nature of the expectation of privacy, the court is refraining
from going too far. It is announcing a new principle, and leaving
it to the lower courts to define its limitations. But to articulate a new
concept based on such subjective guidelines requires more than hints
for definitions. As has been pointed out,163 Belicki and Britt may have
159. See also Comment, Unreasonable Visual Observation Held to Violate Fourth
Amendment, 55 MNN. L. REV. 1255, 1263 (1971), where the author says of State v.
Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970): "The court seems carefully to avoid
specifying any test or standard beyond the skeletal and ambiguous criteria specified in
Katz to determine whether a person has or should have a reasonable expectation of
privacy."
160. 8 Cal. 3d at 892, 506 P.2d at 237, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
161. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
162. 8 Cal. 3d at 891, 506 P.2d at 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
163. See note 124 supra.
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been reflective of a newly emerging principle, but the courts' inability,
or disinclination, to state it in clear and precise terms required a new
statement ten years later (and probably prompted adoption of a new
statutory prohibition).0 Thus, in failing to explain clearly the embry-
onic concept that the court has developed, it may have doomed it to
a limitation to its own facts or to distortion and misinterpretation by
the lower courts.
As it now stands, the case is reasonably open to two interpreta-
tions, with diametrically' opposed results. One such interpretation
would limit the case to police surveillance of public restrooms. Such
a conclusion would be prompted by three considerations. First, Triggs
is the last in a line of California Supreme Court decisions which sought
to limit specifically surveillance in this particular area. In fact, the
court has gradually extended its analysis to cover more diverse fact
situations, starting with completely enclosed toilet stalls, 0 5 then expand-
ing to include stalls which were partially observable to the public,'66
and finally applying it to stalls which were fully observable to the pub-
lic. 1 7  Thus, Triggs represents a final factual permutation of the Cali-
fornia restroom cases. Second, this line of cases may be limited be-
cause of the very private nature of the function ordinarily performed
within this particular protected area. The court notes:
When innocent people are subjected to illegal searches-includ-
ing when, as here, they do not even know their private parts
and bodily functions are being exposed to the gaze of the law-
their rights are violated. .... 168
Finally, there is heavy reliance in Triggs on language from the Bielicki
case, suggesting that the court is merely reaffirming a doctrine it de-
veloped more than ten years ago. As previously discussed, however,
much of this credit has unfortunately been misplaced. 69
Triggs nonetheless is arguably more than a final word or a mere
restatement. It is arguably an innovation in the concept of personal
privacy. Language in the decision specifically indicates that the court
is sanctioning the selective element of this expectation, that one may
164. CAL. PEN. CODE § 653n (West 1970) was passed in 1969, after all but one
of the appellate court decisions upholding this method of surveillance. See also text
accompanying note 13 supra.
165. Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1962).
166. Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849
(1962).
167. E.g., People v. Crafts, 13 Cal. App. 3d 457, 91 Cal. Rptr. 563, (1970). See
note 125 and accompanying text supra.
168. People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 893, 506 P.2d 232, 238, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408,
414 (1973) (emphasis added).
169. See note 145 supra.
have a reasonable expectation concerning a method of observation de-
spite an unreasonable expectation concerning a means of observation.
Moreover, the court has gone to great lengths to articulate a new con-
cept of the expectation of privacy doctrine when it was really not
necessary to do so, 170 and as such it is reasonable to conclude that the
court intends the Triggs decision to extend to other factual situations.
The Effect of Triggs on Search and Seizure Law
The only way to determine the possible effects of this new concept
of privacy is to make reference to the interplay between plain view and
privacy. As seen above, these two doctrines were at first quite compati-
ble, with little chance of direct conflict.171 Privacy required an en-
closed place, and one simply cannot see into a fully enclosed place
(in the legal, not actual, sense.) But with the advent of Katz v.
United Statesa72 and the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the
plain view concept was no longer exclusive of the privacy definition.
It was, in fact, the inability of the California appellate courts to recog-
nize this in the restroom cases that necessitated the People v. Triggs73
decision. In Triggs, the court took great pains to condemn the exten-
sion of the plain view doctrine to include observations justified solely
on the basis of the observability of the acts by the public, regardless
of the method of observation. By doing so the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia placed a further safeguard upon undue extensions of the open
and notorious aspect of plain view. In effect what the court did was
resolve any conflict between privacy and plain view in favor of the
former. In doing so, the court returned to the essence of the plain
view doctrine. It is for this reason that the court says:
Should [the police officer] discover from a location open to the
public, the commission of criminal acts, their observation of what
is in plain view involves no search, and is not subject to the stric-
tures of the Fourth Amendment. . . . Unless he has probable
cause to search, an officer has no right to retreat to a clandestine
position to peer into a restroom, and knowledge gained by or at-
tributable to such clandestine observations suffers from constitu-
tional infirmities . . . . To the extent that they are inconsistent
with this statement of the law, the post Bielicki-Britt cases . . .
are disapproved. 1
74
But the court in Triggs really went much further. The court not
only effectively extended the conceptualization of privacy announced in
Katz, but it added a whole other dimension to that definition. Katz
170. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
171. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
172. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
173. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
174. Id. at 894 n.7, 506 P.2d at 238-39 n.7, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15, n.7 (cita-
tions omitted).
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distinguished the means of observation, visual or auditory, and said that
an individual may have reasonable expectation of privacy as to one par-
ticular means but not as to another. Triggs distinguished the method of
observation, in this case clandestine, from the means, visual or auditory,
and held that an individual may expect privacy from a particular method
of surveillance even if he has no reasonable expectation concerning the
means of observation. The ultimate effect of this decision, when car-
ried to its logical conclusion, would be to preclude all surveillance by
government agents which is not made as any member of the public
might make it. That is, the police would be precluded by the Fourth
Amendment from spying upon citizens unless there were some reason
to suspect that the citizen did not expect such privacy.
By requiring that the police observe and hear as the public does,
the court has returned to the essence of the plain view doctrine. When
it says that an individual may have a reasonable expectation based upon
the method of observation, the court leaves open a wealth of possibili-
ties for curtailing various unwarranted police surveillance practices. Not
only are clandestine observations precluded, but so too would be sur-
veillances aided by artificial or electronic aids. Thus, if an observing
officer were to use binoculars to see through an open window from
a long distance, for example, the search could be disallowed based on
a reasonable expectation of privacy. So too, a private conversation in
a public place picked up by a hidden microphone could be found to
be an unreasonable search because there was a reasonable expectation
that such methods would not be used. We see, therefore, that the court
has provided a uniquely powerful tool for staving off 1984; it only re-
mains to be seen how far it will allow this rationale to be carried.
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